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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OP UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
Case No. 870136

JACK NEIL COLONNA,
Defendant/Appellant.

Pr Lority No. 2

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
INTRODUCTION
The Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts are set
forth in Appellant's Brief at 1-9.

Mr. Colonna takes this

opportunity to reply to portions of Point II and III of Respondent's
Brief.

Issues to which Mr. Colonna does not reply are adequately

covered in Appellant's Opening Brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The due process argument should be reviewed on appeal since
the outrageous conduct of the officer coupled with the ineffective
assistance of counsel makes this an exceptional circumstance where
the issue should be reviewed even though it was not raised in the
trial court.

The record establishes that the conduct of Mr. Colonna

was relatively passive and that the officer's conduct offended
traditional notions of fairness.
Mr. Colonna was prejudiced by the deficient performance of
trial counsel in failing to raise the due process issue at trial.
The State is arguing that this Court should not review the issue

based on counsel's deficient performance in failing to raise it; if
reviewed, the case should be dismissed as a result of the violation.
Mr. Colonna was also prejudiced by Officer Droubay's
testimony regarding Mr. Colonna's past offenses, misconduct
involving violence and reputation.

Given the relatively passive

role of Mr. Colonna and the taint of such information, Mr. Colonna
was prejudiced by counsel's failure to object or otherwise limit the
testimony.
POINT I.
THE OFFICER'S OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT AMOUNTED
TO A DUE PROCESS VIOLATION.
(Reply to Point II)
While State v. Stegell, 660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983)
points out that except in exceptional circumstances, an appellate
court will not review an issue raised for the first time on appeal,
this Court should nevertheless review this issue since the due
process violation rendered the result so "fundamentally unfair11 in
the instant case so as to constitute one of those "exceptional
circumstances" requiring review even though the matter was not
raised in the trial court.
U.S.

, 106 S.Ct.

Van Arsdall, 476 U.S.

See generally Rose v. Clark, 478

, 92 L.Ed.2d 460, 470 (1986); Delaware v.
, 106 S.Ct.

, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986).

The substantial unfairness of allowing this conviction to stand
where the officer instigated the robbery and played a more active
role in it than Mr. Colonna coupled with the ineffective assistance

of trial counsel in failing to raise the issue, makes this an
exceptional circumstance requiring review.
When reviewing the substance of the due process argument,
this Court should not be persuaded by the state's assertion that
Droubay's conduct was not so outrageous as to constitute a due
process violation (Resp. Br. at 17) and its implication that Mr.
Colonna played a "significant independent" role in the incident
(Resp. Br. at 16-17).

Neither assertion is supported by any

citations to the record.
On the contrary, the record indicates that Mr. Colonna
played a relatively minor role in the incident and that Droubay's
conduct was outrageous enough to constitute a due process
violation.

See Appellant's Opening Brief at 26-34.

Mr. Britton

indicated that Mr. Colonna was "mostly just hollering" (T. 102) and
that Colonna kept Officer Droubay from taking a gun that had
sentimental value to Mr. Britton (T. 99) and Mr. Britton's black
leather jacket (T. 105). Droubay himself acknowledged that Colonna
kept him from taking a manifold 1 (T. 65). Mr. Britton testified
that the officer took his wallet and took his money out (T. 106).
Droubay acknowledged taking the wallet but claimed East took the
money out (T. 71-2).

1

Mr. Britton was most frightened by Droubay and

Droubay testified that he saw the manifold on the floor, picked it
up and asked Colonna, "[i]s this your manifold?" (T. 65). Colonna
responded negatively. The implication in such testimony is that
Droubay wanted to take the manifold.

testified that Droubay grabbed Britten's fingers and threatened to
cut another one off

2

(T. 106).

Under the circumstances of this case, the conduct of the
officer was so outrageous as to "'shock [

] . . • the universal

sense of justice1 mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment."

United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1971).
POINT II.

MR. COLONNAfS CONVICTION SHOULD BE REVERSED
AS A RESULT OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
(Reply to Respondent's Point III)
In Point II of its brief at 14-15, the State argues that
this Court should not review the due process argument raised on
appeal

ff

[b]ecause this issue is raised for the first time on

appeal".

Should this Court agree and refuse to review this issue

despite the evidence of police over involvement in a violent crime,
the deficient performance of counsel in failing to raise the issue
at trial would preclude Mr. Colonna from having this issue, which is
an integral aspect of the crime, considered.

Given the facts in

this case and the serious misconduct of the officer, there is a
"reasonable likelihood of a different result" if this issue were
reviewed since the finding of a due process violation would result
in dismissal (See Appellant's Opening Brief at 22-32).

Hence,

Mr. Colonna is prejudiced by counsel's failure to raise the due
process issue at trial.

2

Droubay acknowledged the finger incident but claimed that he did
not threaten to cut one off (T. 96). Droubay was the only person
with gloves on, which further frightened Mr. Britton and suggested a
concern for leaving fingerprints on Droubay's part (T. 74, 188, 198),
- 4

-

The State also claims that Mr. Colonna was not prejudiced
by references to past offenses (Respondent's Brief at 21). The
State attempts to minimize the impact of the information by calling
them "passing references". While the State is free to describe any
testimony as a "passing reference", each such "passing reference",
is nevertheless a piece of evidence heard and retained by the jury
and considered as part of the jury's decision.

The "passing

references" in this case were direct responses to the prosecutor's
questions and referred to prior crimes, incidents involving
violence, incidents involving disrespect for police officers and a
reference to Mr. Colonna's background and character which implied
that he is a well known bad actor.
38-44.

See Appellant's Opening Brief at

By the time the fourth such "passing reference" reached the

jury, unless the jurors were asleep, they had heard and retained
evidence that Mr. Colonna was a bad and violent person.
The state claims that the "substantial evidence" of
Mr. Colonna's guilt negates the prejudice prong without specifically
outlining that evidence.

Of the three participants in this crime,

Mr. Colonna was the most passive, regardless of whose testimony is
cited.

Droubay himself acknowledged that he believed Mr. Colonna

was just talking big and that the drugs were talking.

Mr. Britton

testified that Mr. Colonna did not do "a whole lot. He was mostly
just hollering" (R. 193). Substantial evidence of Mr. Colonna's
guilt does not exist in this case; nor does substantial evidence
that Mr. Colonna would have committed the crime had Droubay not

- 5

-

supplied him with drugs and alcohol, taken him to Britton's house
and participated and egged him on.

Had the jury not been given

information that suggested Jack to be a violent and dangerous man,
there is a "reasonable likelihood of a different result,"
Furthermore, as Justice Zimmerman pointed out in his
concurring opinion in State v. Bishop, 75 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 47
(February 3, 1988):
This Court's decisions have consistently recognized
that an accused is almost certainly prejudiced
unfairly when evidence of unrelated crimes or bad acts
is introduced because of "the tendency of a fact
finder to convict the accused because of bad character
rather than because he [or she] is shown to be guilty
of the offenses charged." [citations omitted]
Given the relatively passive role played by Mr. Colonna in
this crime and the acknowledged prejudicial effect of unrelated
crimes or bad acts, the statements in this case prejudiced
Mr. Colonna.
CONCLUSION
For any of the foregoing reasons, Appellant seeks reversal
of his conviction and remand of his case to the District Court for
dismissal of the charges or in the alternative a new trial.
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DATED this

/

day of May, 1988.
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